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JAGGED LITTLE PILL: THE NEW FRONTIER FOR SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
PLANS AND THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF TARGET BOARDS
Hunter Parsons*

A. Introduction
In Oliver Stone’s 1987 drama, Wall Street, Gordon Gekko, played by Michael
Douglas, declares that the market for corporate control is “a zero sum game—
somebody wins, somebody loses. Money itself isn’t lost or made, it’s simply transferred from one perception to another.” In Canada, the provincial securities
regulators play an important role in determining the winners and losers in the “zero sum game” of hostile takeover bids through the regulation of defensive tactics.1
The decision of a target board of directors to take defensive action in the face of a
hostile bid by deploying a shareholder rights plan (or “poison pill”) is the frontier
where corporate law meets securities regulation.
A poison pill works by making a corporate takeover prohibitively expensive.2
The typical poison pill gives the shareholders of the corporation the right to purchase additional shares of the corporation at a price well below market value upon
the occurrence of a triggering event. In the event that an acquiror obtains a specified percentage of a class of shares in the target corporation, the right to purchase is
triggered. The terms of the poison pill will exclude the acquiror from participating
in the exercise of the rights plan. If the poison pill is triggered, then the acquiror
faces the prospect of having to buy enough of the newly issued shares to achieve a
majority interest in the corporation.
Two recent securities commission decisions have blurred the line between corporate law and securities regulation by venturing into an analysis of the fiduciary

* Hunter Parsons holds a J.D. from the Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University. He is currently
articling at Borden Ladner Gervais in Vancouver, BC. He would like to thank Professor Sarah Bradley
for her helpful comments and valuable assistance in writing this paper.
Takeover Bids – Defensive Tactics, OSC NP 62-202 (4 July 1997) [NP 62-202]; Christopher C Nicholls,
Mergers, Acquisitions and Other Changes of Corporate Control, 2d ed (Toronto, Ontario: Irwin Law,
2012) at 196 (when one corporation decides that it wants to acquire control of another corporation
against the wishes of the target corporation’s board and management, this is referred to as a “hostile”
takeover).
2
See Ronald Podolny, “Fixing What Ain’t Broke: In Defence of Canadian Poison Pill Regulation” (2009)
67(1) UT Fac L Rev 47 (QL).
1

126

Jagged Little Pill

Vol. 22

duties of target boards in the context of poison pill regulation.3 This has increased
the tension between corporate law and securities regulation, but has also highlighted the divergent approaches to poison pill regulation amongst three of the largest
provincial securities commissions: the Ontario Securities Commission (the
“OSC”), the Alberta Securities Commission (the “ASC”), and the British Columbia
Securities Commission (the “BCSC”). At corporate law, the directors’ fiduciary
duties do not change in the context of a hostile takeover bid: the target board is
required to act in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation.4 Reviewing
courts will typically afford deference to the business judgment of the target board
in the face of a hostile bid. The business judgment rule provides that the directors
of a corporation are not required to make perfect decisions. So long as the directors’ course of action is reasonable, then reviewing courts will apply a deferential
approach to their decision.5 In contrast, securities regulation utilizes an interventionist approach in the context of a hostile bid so as to ensure that shareholders are
not denied their right to choose whether to tender to the bid.6 This raises the distinct possibility of a target board deploying a poison pill in accordance with its
fiduciary duty that may be found to be in violation of the corporation’s obligations
under securities regulation.
In response to the current tumult in poison pill regulation, the Canadian Securities Administrators (the “CSA”) released Proposed National Instrument 62-105
(the “Proposed Policy”) on March 14, 2013. The Proposed Policy purports to fundamentally change the regulatory approach for poison pills. Under the existing
regulatory framework, articulated in National Policy 62-202 (“NP 62-202”), the
provincial securities regulators have, for the most part, treated poison pills as a
temporary defensive tactic. After a series of conflicting decisions from the ASC,
OSC, and BCSC on the utility of poison pills in the context of a hostile takeover
bid, the Proposed Policy is an attempt to remove this defensive tactic from the purview of ad hoc regulatory review. The Proposed Policy, if adopted, will allow a
target board to completely block a hostile takeover bid through a poison pill so
long as it receives shareholder ratification within 90 days of its adoption and annually thereafter.7
This paper will consider the merits of the existing regulatory framework, NP
62-202, and the anticipated benefits of the Proposed Policy. The author will analyze
a recent line of securities commission decisions that have blurred the distinction
between the fiduciary duty analysis under corporate law and the public interest
powers to cease trade a poison pill under securities regulation. The prevailing approach in the securities regulation context will be canvassed and compared with
the current corporate law concerning the fiduciary duties of target boards in the
face of a hostile bid. This paper will detail the ways in which these approaches conNeo Material Technologies Inc (Re), 2009 LNONOSC 638 [Re Neo]; Pulse Data Inc (Re), 2007 ABASC
895 [Re Pulse Data].
4
BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 at para 44 [BCE].
5
Pente Investment Management Ltd v Schneider Corp, [1998] OJ No 4142 at para 34 (ONCA) [Pente
Investment Management].
6
NP 62-202, supra note 1, s 1.1(5).
7
Proposed National Instrument 62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans, CSA Notice and Request for Comment, 36 OSCB 2643 at 2663 (2013) [Proposed Policy].
3
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flict and create inconsistent results. Finally, the author will consider this problem
in light of the Proposed Policy, and will offer some thoughts concerning the intersection of directors’ obligations under the proposed regulatory framework and
their fiduciary duty under corporate law.
The author argues that the Proposed Policy will reduce the current uncertainty
in securities law since poison pills will essentially be self-regulating. However, the
Proposed Policy does nothing to resolve the conflict between securities and corporate law. The directors’ statutory power and discretion to manage the corporation
will be impaired so long as securities commissions continue to regulate poison pills
and other defensive tactics. The Proposed Policy indicates this will continue to be
the case. Therefore, in the face of a hostile bid, the interests of the shareholders will
prevail over the interests of the other stakeholders in the corporation. This is a
dramatic departure from the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada
in two recent decisions on directors’ fiduciary duties. The Proposed Policy will
fundamentally alter corporate decision-making in boardrooms across the country.
B. The Current Regulatory Framework for Poison Pills
Pursuant to Ontario’s Securities Act (the “OSA”), an “interested person” may
bring an application to the commission to cease trade a poison pill.8 The definition
of “interested person” includes an offeror, which captures all hostile bidders who
are faced with a target board that has implemented a poison pill.9 After hearing the
application, the commission may make an order “directing the directors […] to
comply with or to cease contravening a requirement under […] the regulations
related to this part.”10 The combination of the definition of “regulations” and
“rules” in the OSA gives authority to the national policy that provides the framework for poison pill regulation: NP 62-202.11
NP 62-202 recognizes that directors of a target corporation may take certain
“defensive measures” in an effort to defeat an unsolicited bid.12 However, the policy
states that the primary objective of the takeover bid provisions in securities legislation is to protect the “bona fide interests of the shareholders of a target company.”13
This policy is aimed at defensive tactics deployed by a target board that have the
effect of denying shareholders the ability to decide whether to tender their shares
into the bid.14 NP 62-202 specifically identifies poison pills as “defensive tactics that
may come under scrutiny” when used in the face of a hostile bid.15 The policy cautions that regulators will “take appropriate action if they become aware of defensive

Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S 5, s 104(1) [OSA]. For the purposes of this paper, the Ontario securities
legislation, regulations and rules will be used.
9
Ibid, s 103(b) and (c).
10
Ibid, s 104(1)(e).
11
Ibid, s 1(1) “regulations” and “rules.”
12
NP 62-202, supra note 1, s 1.1(1).
13
Ibid, s 1.1(2).
14
Ibid, s 1.1(5).
15
Ibid, s 1.1(4)(a).
8
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tactics that will likely result in shareholders being deprived of the ability to respond
to the take-over bid.”16
Until recently, NP 62-202 and the corresponding body of regulatory decisions
were clear that a target board could not use a poison pill to completely block a hostile takeover bid.17 According to securities regulators, target boards could only use a
poison pill as a temporary defensive tactic in order to generate a more favourable
offer for the shareholders of the target corporation.18 However, a 2007 decision
from the ASC and a 2009 decision from the OSC ended almost twenty years of stability and certainty in poison pill regulation. In Re Pulse Data19 and Re Neo,20 the
respective commissions held that, in certain circumstances, it is permissible for a
poison pill to remain in place indefinitely under NP 62-202. A subsequent case
from the BCSC, Re Lions Gate,21 signaled a return to the traditional poison pill
analysis. However, in a 2010 case, Re Baffinland,22 the OSC took the middle ground
by confirming the temporary nature of poison pills, but declined to expressly reject
the approach utilized by the hearing panel in Re Neo. This has left securities regulation and the market for corporate control in a state of flux, with disagreement
among the most active provincial securities commissions as to the appropriate approach to poison pill regulation.
C. The Intersection of Corporate Law and Securities Regulation: Poison Pills
The regulation of unsolicited takeover bids involving corporations that are “reporting issuers” under the OSA falls squarely within the public interest jurisdiction
of provincial securities commissions.23 However, NP 62-202 necessarily involves
issues of corporate governance, which is arguably beyond the narrow jurisdiction
of securities commissions. Under corporate law, so long as directors act in good
faith and in the best interests of the corporation, the target board can use defensive
tactics, such as poison pills to, in effect, “just say no” to an unsolicited takeover
bid.24 However, NP 62-202 exhibits a clear preference for shareholder choice, regardless of whether the unsolicited bid is in the best interests of the corporation.25
Therefore, on the same set of facts, securities regulators could order the recession
of a poison pill for violating the shareholder choice principle, while the directors,
under existing corporate law principles, could be fulfilling their fiduciary duty to
the corporation under the Canadian Business Corporations Act (CBCA) by using a
poison pill to completely block a hostile bid.26
Ibid, s 1.1(5).
Canadian Jorex Ltd (Re) (1992), 15 OSCB 257 at 263 and 264 [Re Canadian Jorex]; NP 62-202, supra
note 1, s 1.1(5).
18
Re Canadian Jorex, supra note 17 at 263.
19
Re Pulse Data, supra note 3.
20
Re Neo, supra note 3.
21
Lions Gate Entertainment Corp (Re), 2010 BCSECCOM 432 [Re Lions Gate].
22
Baffinland Iron Mines Corp (Re), 2010 LNONOSC 904 [Re Baffinland].
23
OSA, supra note 8, s 1(1) “reporting issuer.”
24
Teck Corp Ltd v Millar, [1972] BCJ No 566, at para 103 (BCSC) [Teck].
25
NP 62-202, supra note 1, s 1.1(2).
26
Canadian Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, ss 102 and 122(1)(a) [CBCA]; NP 62-202,
supra note 1.
16
17
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The Early Approach to Poison Pill Regulation: The “When, Not If” Era

Through their interpretation of NP 62-202, the provincial securities commissions have taken the position that it is the target’s shareholders, not its directors,
who should ultimately decide whether or not the company will be sold.27 Starting
with the OSC’s 1992 decision in Re Canadian Jorex, securities commissions have
held that poison pills will be permitted to remain in place so long as they continue
to have utility in one of two respects: either inducing a competing bid to come forward, or persuading the bidder to make a better offer.28 When one of these things
happens, or once it becomes apparent that neither will happen, then the poison pill
has outlived its usefulness, and the “pill has got to go.”29
In Re Canadian Jorex, the OSC was careful to point out that they were not making a “ruling with respect to the conduct of the Jorex board in adopting the rights
plan.”30 For the OSC, the central issue was not whether the target board acted in
good faith by adopting the poison pill, but whether it was in the public interest for
the poison pill to remain in place.31 However, the OSC acknowledged that, on the
facts of the dispute before the commission, they did not have to decide whether the
adoption of the poison pill itself was in the best interests of the corporation.32
Through the obiter in Re Canadian Jorex, the OSC recognized that poison pill
hearings highlight the inherent tension between the public interest jurisdiction of
securities regulators and corporate law principles. In the OSC’s 1998 decision, Re
CW Shareholdings, this tension was explored further. The commission said it was
appropriate for them to “look into the question of whether there has been a breach
of fiduciary duties” where it is in the public interest to do so in the “particular
case.”33 The mere fact that the aggrieved party has commenced concurrent claims
before the securities commission and the superior court does not mean that the
jurisdiction of the commission will be ousted.34 The OSC observed that corporate
law and securities regulation will often intersect, especially in the context of a hostile takeover bid. So long as the commission considers the issue of fiduciary duties
from the perspective of its public interest jurisdiction, this is a permissible exercise
of its power.
The tension between the duties of target boards under corporate law and the
public interest jurisdiction of securities commissions was central to the OSC’s 1994
decision, Re Lac Minerals.35 In this decision, the OSC recognized the inherent conflict between the “board’s duty to manage the corporation honestly and in good
faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation” and the shareholders’
right to decide whether to tender their shares to the takeover bid.36 The OSC noted
27

Robert O Hansen, “The Clash of the Rights Plan Cases: Should I Stay or Should I Go?” (10 January
2011), online: McCarthy Tétrault January 2011, McCarthy Tétrault, at 1 <http://www.mccarthy.ca>.
28
Re Canadian Jorex, supra note 17 at 263.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid at 262.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
CW Shareholdings Inc (Re), 21 OSCB 2910 at para 45 [Re CW Shareholdings].
34
Ibid.
35
Lac Minerals Ltd (Re), 17 OSCB 4963 at para 52 [Re Lac Minerals].
36
Ibid at para 56.
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that, where the target board is taking action in a good faith attempt to increase
shareholder value, then the commission will interfere with the conduct of the
board as little as possible, particularly “when to do so might relieve them of their
duties under corporate or fiduciary law.”37 However, the corollary is that, where the
board is not responding to the bid by attempting to increase shareholder value,
then the securities commission will exercise its public interest jurisdiction and
cease trade the poison pill.
2.

Neo and Pulse: The “Just Say No” Era

Following Re Canadian Jorex, securities regulators allowed poison pills to temporarily remain in place so long as they continued to have utility by enhancing
shareholder value.38 After that, it was time for the pill to go. This seemingly certain
position was whittled away in 2007 by the ASC in Re Pulse Data.39 In that case, an
unsolicited takeover bid was made for all of the shares of Pulse Data at a small
premium above the market price at the time. In response, Pulse Data’s board
adopted a poison pill that was ratified at a subsequent shareholder meeting by 98%
of the shareholders.40 Pulse Data stated that it did not plan to seek an alternative
bid and sought to use the poison pill to defeat the bid. The ASC declined to cease
trade the poison pill since it was reluctant to “interfere with a decision of the Pulse
Board that has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of Pulse Shareholders,
particularly when that decision had very recently been approved by informed
Shareholders.”41
In Re Pulse Data, the ASC allowed the target board to completely block the unsolicited bid through the use of a poison pill. This runs counter to the historical
interpretation of NP 62-202 and the Re Canadian Jorex line of cases. The ASC appears to cede to the business judgment of the Pulse Data board and affords
deference to their decision to implement a poison pill in the face of a hostile bid.42
This is consistent with the corporate law approach toward the use of defensive tactics in the context of a hostile takeover bid, but it represents a departure from the
traditional regulatory framework.
In 2009, the OSC had the opportunity to consider Re Pulse Data in Re Neo.43 In
that case, the target board had a shareholder-approved poison pill in place prior to
the takeover bid. Pala Investments, which held 20% of the outstanding shares of
Neo, structured a takeover bid in such a way that it would not trigger the existing
poison pill. In response, the Neo board adopted a second poison pill in order to
block Pala Investment’s bid. 81% of Neo’s shareholders (excluding the bidder’s
shares) ratified the second poison pill. Neo’s board said that Pala Investment’s bid
was attempting to deny the shareholders the benefit of the control premium
through the structure of their bid and, after a consideration of alternatives to the
bid, it was inappropriate for Neo to initiate an auction or negotiate with Pala InIbid at para 65.
Re Canadian Jorex, supra note 17.
39
Re Pulse Data, supra note 3.
40
Ibid at para 69.
41
Ibid at para 101.
42
Pente Investment Management, supra note 5 at para 34.
43
Re Neo, supra note 3.
37
38
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vestments.44 The OSC declined to cease trade the rights plan and commented that,
although the primary purpose for adopting a poison pill is typically to allow the
target board to pursue alternative transactions, this is not “the only legitimate purpose for a shareholder rights plan.”45 In doing so, the OSC allowed the Neo board
to “just say no” to Pala Investment’s takeover bid through the use of the second
poison pill.
In Re Neo, the OSC commented on the intersection of the fiduciary duties of
target boards and their obligations pursuant to NP 62-202. The OSC recognized
that the business judgment rule has applicability in the securities regulation context,46 and deferred to the business judgment of the Neo board, holding that the
target does not have to “permit and facilitate an auction of company shares each
and every time an offeror makes a bid.”47 In this case, the OSC declined to interfere
with the decision to adopt the second poison pill because the decision to avoid an
auction that was not in the best interests of the corporation was within the business
judgment of the board, and there was no reason to suggest that it was made “in any
manner other than in furtherance of its fiduciary obligations to the corporation.”48
3.

Baffinland and Lions Gate: The “Uncertain” Era

Following Re Pulse Data and Re Neo, the provincial securities commissions entered a period of uncertainty with regard to their approach to poison pill
regulation. The willingness of the ASC and OSC to use a corporate law-inspired
analysis in contested poison pill applications attracted criticism from academics
and market participants. The OSC and BCSC responded to Re Pulse Data and Re
Neo with decisions that attempted to restore order to poison pill regulation in Canada.
In Re Baffinland, Nunavut Iron made an unsolicited takeover bid for all of the
outstanding common shares of Baffinland in September 2010 for a price of $0.80
per share.49 The Baffinland board already had a poison pill in place that received
shareholder approval in March 2009.50 Following Nunavut Iron’s takeover bid announcement, the Baffinland board entered into a support agreement with another
party, ArcelorMittal, who agreed to make a bid for all of the outstanding shares of
Baffinland for $1.10 per common share.51 As part of the support agreement, Baffinland agreed to waive the poison pill immediately prior to the expiration of the
ArcelorMittal offer.52 In essence, the Baffinland board was using the support
agreement and the poison pill to “just say no” to Nunavut Iron’s unsolicited bid
and allow ArcelorMittal’s bid to go to the shareholders. Nunavut Iron brought an
application to the OSC seeking an order to cease trade the poison pill.

Ibid at para 71.
Ibid at para 107.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid at para 109.
48
Ibid at para 114.
49
Ibid at para 2.
50
Ibid at para 8.
51
Ibid at para 9.
52
Ibid at para 12.
44
45
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The OSC decided to cease trade the poison pill because it had already facilitated
an auction, and therefore, it was no longer necessary. Having received an additional offer following Nunavut Iron’s bid, the poison pill achieved its purpose, so it was
time for the pill to go.53 The OSC commented that “it will not permit a rights plan
to be used for the purpose only of eliminating the timing advantage available to the
first bidder.”54 Although Nunavut Iron did not indicate that it planned on increasing the price of its bid, the OSC held that, ultimately, “it is the Baffinland
shareholders who should determine the outcome of the two competing bids for
their shares.”55
In Re Baffinland, the OSC took the opportunity to comment on Re Neo, and in
particular, on whether the business judgment rule has any applicability in poison
pill regulation.56 The OSC observed that Re Neo involved unusual facts, specifically
that shareholder approval of the poison pill took place only two weeks before the
hearing.57 The OSC commented that “in Neo, the Commission concluded that it
should defer to the wishes of the shareholders as expressed by the recent shareholder vote.”58 The panel went on to state that “in our view, Neo does not stand for
the proposition that the Commission will defer to the business judgment of a board
of directors in considering whether to cease trade a rights plan, or that a board of
directors in the exercise of its fiduciary duties may ‘just say no’ to a takeover bid.”59
Despite this assertion, the commission went on to say that a consideration of
whether the target board is acting pursuant to its fiduciary duty is a relevant, but
secondary, consideration in deciding whether to cease trade a poison pill.60
The BCSC had its opportunity to comment on Re Neo and Re Pulse Data in its
2010 decision, Re Lions Gate.61 This case involved an attempted takeover of Lions
Gate by noted corporate-raider Carl Ichan through his corporation, Ichan Partners. In March 2010, when Ichan held 18.8% of Lions Gate’s common shares, he
made a takeover bid for up to 13 million Lions Gate shares, which would have given him 29.9% of the issued and outstanding shares of the corporation.62 In
response, the Lions Gate board adopted a poison pill and scheduled a shareholder
meeting to ratify it. After failed negotiations between Ichan and the Lions Gate
directors, the target board concluded that a change of control was not in the best
interests of the corporation at that time. They took no steps to seek an alternative
transaction or commence an auction.63 In response, Ichan brought an application
to the BCSC before the shareholder meeting took place.
The BCSC cease traded the Lions Gate poison pill because it denied the shareholders their right to choose whether to tender to the bid.64 In doing so, the
Ibid at para 32.
Ibid at para 34.
55
Ibid at para 55.
56
Re Baffinland, supra note 22 at para 47.
57
Ibid at para 48.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid at para 51.
60
Ibid.
61
Re Lions Gate, supra note 21.
62
Ibid at para 16.
63
Ibid at para 24.
64
Ibid at para 29.
53
54
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commission took the opportunity to comment on the intersection between the
fiduciary duty of the target board and NP 62-202. Additionally, the BCSC considered whether the target board could “just say no” to an unsolicited bid through the
implementation of a poison pill.
On the fiduciary duty issue, the BCSC commented that “a target company
board, faced with a hostile bid, has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the
corporation, and the regulators are reluctant to interfere with actions taken by a
target company board to discharge that duty.”65 However, they went on to say that
securities commissions will only be reluctant to interfere where the target board is
making efforts to maximize shareholder value, and that the target company’s
shareholders should ultimately have the opportunity to decide whether to tender to
the bid.66 The BCSC said that whether the target board met its fiduciary duty will
not factor into the securities commission’s decision-making.67 Unless the board
behaves improperly—that is, in breach of its fiduciary duty—then compliance with
its duties under the CBCA will be a neutral factor.68
The BCSC declined to defer to the business judgment of the Lions Gate board.
The fact that the target board had a reasonable belief that a change of control was
not in the best interests of the corporation was an irrelevant consideration for the
commission. Although the directors may have met their fiduciary duty by attempting to block the bid, “the board should not expect Canadian securities regulators to
allow a [shareholder rights plan] to interfere with the shareholders’ right to decide
whether to tender into the bid.”69
In this decision, the BCSC reaffirmed the “when, not if” approach under NP 62202: where the target board is not taking active steps to increase shareholder value
in response to an unsolicited bid, then the poison pill will not be allowed to continue.70 The BCSC observed that the mere fact that the target shareholders approved
the poison pill does not mean that the target can “just say no” to an unsolicited
takeover bid. Shareholder approval may be a relevant factor, but it is not determinative.71 For the BCSC, “the principle that the shareholders must always have the
opportunity to decide cannot co-exist with one that would allow target company
boards to ‘just say no’ to bids.”72
4.

The Current Role of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in Poison Pill Regulation

It is evident that, since Re Pulse Data was released in 2007, the provincial securities commissions have disagreed on the extent that directors’ fiduciary duties are
relevant in poison pill regulation. Particularly, there has been disagreement
amongst the ASC, OSC, and BCSC as to whether the business judgment rule applies to a target board’s decision to implement a poison pill in the face of a hostile
bid. Re Neo and Re Pulse Data reveal that the OSC and ASC are willing, in some
Ibid at para 50.
Ibid at para 53.
67
Ibid at para 62.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid at para 66.
70
Ibid at para 68.
71
Ibid at para 91.
72
Ibid at para 84.
65
66
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circumstances, to apply corporate law principles to the resolution of disputes in the
securities regulation forum. These hearing panels were willing to defer to the directors’ business judgment where there was recent and informed shareholder approval
of the poison pill. Perhaps the unique factual scenarios that gave rise to each of
these decisions emboldened the hearing panels to depart from the separation between corporate law and securities regulation endorsed by Re CW Shareholdings
and Re Lac Minerals. Regardless of the impetus for the Re Neo and Re Pulse Data
decisions, however, their effects continue to be felt through the uncertainty associated with poison pill regulation today.
In Re Lions Gate and Re Bafflinland, the tension between the BCSC and OSC on
this issue is readily apparent. In Re Baffinland, the OSC refused to defer to the
business judgment of the target board in deciding whether to cease trade a poison
pill. In that case, the OSC signalled that it will not hesitate to issue a cease trade
order, even if the target board fulfils its fiduciary duty by blocking a bid through
the implementation of a poison pill. The hearing panel in Re Baffinland affirmed
that the public interest is best served where the target shareholders have the opportunity to decide whether to tender to the bid. In the securities regulation context,
the shareholders’ right to choose trumps the directors’ duty under corporate law.
This assertion is supported by the BCSC in Re Lions Gate. The OSC and BCSC are
consistent on this issue.
However, these two commissions disagree as to whether the target board’s
compliance with its fiduciary duty is relevant to poison pill regulation. In Re Baffinland, the OSC opined that whether the target board of directors acted in the best
interests of the corporation and complied with their fiduciary duty is a “relevant,
although secondary, consideration for the Commission in deciding whether to
cease trade a rights plan.”73 There is tension between this position and the BCSC’s
approach. In Re Lions Gate, the hearing panel commented that, unless a target
board fails to discharge its fiduciary duty to the corporation, then compliance will
be a “neutral factor.” The BCSC indicated that they will only be reluctant to interfere with the target board’s decision to implement a poison pill when they are
seeking an improved or alternative transaction.74 This is consistent with the approach endorsed by the OSC in Re Lac Minerals.
Some commentators have taken the opportunity to argue that “the prevailing
inter-provincial inconsistency in applying National Policy 62-202 to poison pills
[is] tailor-made as an argument for a national securities regulator.”75 However, in
2012, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the proposed federal Securities Act,
which attempted to create a national securities regulator, was ultra vires Parliament’s general trade and commerce power under subsection 91(2) of the
Constitution Act, 1867.76 In the wake of this failed attempt to create a national securities regulator, Canada is left with three of its most active provincial securities
regulators unable to agree on a coherent analysis under NP 62-202, leaving legal
advisors to target boards guessing at which approach will apply in a given case.
Re Baffinland, supra note 22 at para 51.
Re Lions Gate, supra note 21 at para 64.
75
Mark Gelowitz, “Baffinland: A new frontier for poison pills?” (2011) 30 Lawyer’s Weekly 38.
76
Reference Re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66 [Re Securities Act].
73
74
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The disjointed approach to poison pill regulation is compounded by the conflicting standards for the use of poison pills under corporate law and pursuant to
securities regulation. Under corporate law, so long as the directors respond to the
hostile takeover bid in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation, then
they will meet their fiduciary duty pursuant to paragraph 122(1)(a) of the CBCA.
The director-centric approach under corporate law is diametrically opposed to the
shareholder-choice model of securities regulation. To illustrate this point, the following section will articulate the fiduciary duty of a target board in the face of a
hostile bid under corporate law.
D. The Corporate Law Approach: Directors’ Fiduciary Duties
1.

Canada Business Corporations Act

In contrast to the shareholder-choice model utilized by securities regulators
through NP 62-202, Canadian courts have adopted a deferential approach to the
decisions of target boards in the face of a hostile bid.77 For a company incorporated
under the CBCA, directors are given the broad power to “manage […] the business
and affairs of the corporation.”78 The powers of the shareholders under the CBCA
are limited: they have the right to vote at any meeting of the shareholders,79 to receive any dividend declared by the corporation,80 and to receive any remaining
property of the company upon dissolution.81 The directors are charged with managing the affairs of the corporation in accordance with their fiduciary duties. The
CBCA imposes a statutory fiduciary duty on the corporation’s directors to “act
honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.”82 So
long as the directors fulfil this requirement, then pursuant to the business judgment rule, they have wide discretion to manage the corporation.
The statutory fiduciary duty contained in the CBCA is owed to the corporation
generally, and not to a particular group of shareholders or stakeholders.83 The
CBCA provides limited guidance as to the precise content of the directors’ fiduciary
duty. The common law has not been entirely helpful in fleshing out the content of
the target board’s fiduciary duty in the context of a hostile takeover bid; however,
the case law provides some broad guidelines for target boards in the face of a hostile bid.
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Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: General Common Law Approach
(i) BCE and Peoples

In BCE and Peoples, the Supreme Court of Canada provided the latest articulations of the directors’ fiduciary duty.84 The court commented that the “fiduciary
duty of the directors to the corporation is a broad, contextual concept. It is not
confined to short-term profit or share value.”85 The fiduciary duty looks to the
long-term interests of the corporation and the “content of this duty varies with the
situation at hand.”86 The court went on to recognize that, in considering the best
interests of the corporation, the directors may look to the interests of “shareholders, employees, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their
decisions.”87
The Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that the directors’ fiduciary duty is
“to the corporation, and only to the corporation.”88 Where the interests of the corporation and the various stakeholders of the corporation are in conflict, then the
directors owe their duty to the corporation.89 The court rejected a line of case law
coming from the Delaware Supreme Court which holds that the directors’ fiduciary
duty changes in the context of a takeover bid.90 Instead, the court recognized that
there is no “fixed rule” for the content of the directors’ fiduciary duty. Even where a
corporation is on the verge of bankruptcy, as was the case in Peoples, the directors’
duty remains to the corporation as a whole and not to the creditors or any other
stakeholders specifically.91 In this context, the “best interests of the corporation”
does not mean the “best interests of the creditors,” but rather, it means the “maximization of the value of the corporation.”92 Although neither BCE nor Peoples
involved a hostile takeover, these cases seem to suggest the target board’s fiduciary
duty does not change even in that context: it remains to the corporation and not to
the shareholders specifically.93
3.

Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: Takeover Bid Context

The takeover bid presents a unique challenge to the target board’s fiduciary duty. If the takeover bid is successful, then the target board and management will
likely be replaced by the new controlling shareholder. Therefore, the target directors might be motivated to try and defeat the takeover bid for self-interested
reasons. The use of defensive tactics such as poison pills therefore places target
BCE, supra note 4; Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68 [Peoples].
BCE, supra note 4 at para 38.
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid at para 40.
88
Ibid at para 66.
89
Ibid.
90
Under Delaware corporate law, when the target board takes defensive action in the face of a bid, their
actions are subject to the Unocal “enhanced scrutiny” standard: the defensive action must be proportionate to the threat posed by the hostile bid. In a situation where a change of control is inevitable, then
the so-called Revlon duty applies: the duty of the target board changes from the preservation of the
corporation to the maximization of shareholder value. See Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings
Inc 506 A 2d 173 (Del 1986) [Revlon]; Unocal v Mesa Petroleum 493 A 2d 946 (Del 1985) [Unocal].
91
Peoples, supra note 84 at para 43.
92
Ibid at para 42.
93
BCE, supra note 4 at para 88.
84
85

!

Vol. 22

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

137

boards in an inherent conflict of interest. In the context of a takeover bid, courts
have commented that the target board should attempt to minimize this inherent
conflict of interest by striking a special committee to consider the merits of the bid
and make an independent recommendation to the board as to how to proceed.94
A takeover bid will typically offer the shareholders a significant premium over
the current market price for their shares. However, this short-term benefit to the
shareholders does not necessarily mean that the bid is in the best interests of the
corporation.95 Since there are a number of different motivations from the bidder,
including the break-up of the target, corporate law allows the target board to take
defensive action to defeat the bid so long as it is in the best interests of the corporation. For this reason, “it is difficult to formulate general rules to govern the
behaviour of directors and managers when a bid is made or in anticipation of a
bid.”96 For instance, in circumstances where the directors have insider knowledge
that leads them to believe that the value of the corporation is higher than the value
of the bid, then defensive measures that protect corporate value will be in the best
interests of the corporation.97
The Supreme Court of Canada has yet to hear a case specifically involving the
directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of a hostile takeover bid. Following BCE and
Peoples, it appears that the nature of the directors’ fiduciary duty does not change
in the face of a hostile bid. So long as they act in good faith and in the best interests
of the corporation, then target boards can take defensive action to block an unsolicited bid. However, the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada has yet to hear a
takeover bid case leaves open the possibility that a different standard may apply in
the context of a hostile change of control.
No other Canadian courts have developed a coherent analytical framework delineating the content of the directors’ fiduciary duty in the context of a hostile
takeover bid either. There are two competing approaches to the question of who
should ultimately decide whether the takeover bid is successful: the directors or the
shareholders. The shareholder-centric approach argues that, once a takeover bid is
made, any defensive action that interferes with the shareholders’ right to decide
whether to tender into the bid is impermissible. The competing approach is the
director-centric model: directors are in the best position to determine whether a
takeover bid is in the best interests of the corporation. So long as the directors act
in accordance with their fiduciary duty, then they are permitted to take action to
block the bid. Although the law is far from settled, it appears as though the director-centric approach, which was adopted by the British Columbia Supreme Court
in Teck, most closely articulates the current Canadian position.98
(i) The Director-Centric Approach: Teck
Teck arose from a battle for the control of a corporation, Afton, that owned an
undeveloped copper mine near Kamloops, British Columbia. Teck Corp. was the
largest shareholder of Afton and they sought to gain a majority so that they could
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enter into an agreement with Afton to bring the mine into production. The directors of Afton opposed Teck Corp.’s desire to bring the mine into production as
they had misgivings about Teck Corp.’s reputation, technical capacity and experience in developing similarly-situated mines.99 The directors wanted to see Afton’s
principal asset, the copper property, “developed efficiently and profitably.”100 In the
directors’ opinion, Teck Corp. was not the best company to do this, so they issued a
large number of shares to a third party, Placer, thereby diluting Teck Corp.’s voting
power. Afton proceeded to enter into a development agreement with Placer and
Teck Corp. responded by bringing an action against Afton’s directors for breach of
fiduciary duty.
In Teck, the court held that the Afton directors did not violate their fiduciary
duty to the corporation through the dilutive share issuance since they held a reasonable belief that it was in the best interests of the corporation for Placer to
develop the mine.101 In arriving at this holding, Berger J. wrestled with the central
problem of directors’ fiduciary duties in the context of a hostile change of control
transaction:102
If the directors have the right to consider the consequences of a takeover, and to exercise their powers to meet it, if they do so bona fide in the
interests of the company, how is the court to determine their purpose?
In every case the directors will insist their whole purpose was to serve
the company’s interest. And no doubt in most cases it will not be difficult for the directors to persuade themselves that it is in the company’s
best interests that they should remain in office. Something more than a
mere assertion of good faith is required.

In response to this evidentiary problem, Berger J. formulated the following test
for determining whether the directors of a target corporation have met their fiduciary duty: first, the directors must act in good faith, and second, where the directors
believe that a change of control will result in “substantial damage to the company’s
interests” then there must be reasonable grounds for this belief.103 If there are no
reasonable grounds, this will justify a finding that the directors were “actuated by
an improper purpose.”104 In other words, where the target directors do not hold a
reasonable belief that a substantial threat to the corporation exists, and their sole
purpose for the dilutive share issuance is to “freeze out” a group of shareholders,
then their fiduciary duty to the corporation will not be met.105
The approach in Teck has been followed or cited with approval by many courts
across Canada, including the Ontario Court of Appeal.106 In Peoples, the Supreme
Court of Canada cited Teck for the narrow proposition that, in considering whether the directors are acting in the best interests of the corporation, the board may
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consider the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders of the corporation.107
Despite this relatively wide-spread acceptance, at least two cases have attempted to
derogate from the director-centric rule in Teck in favour of an approach that focuses on shareholder choice in the context of a hostile takeover bid.
(ii) The Shareholder Choice Approaches: Producers Pipeline and Exco
A 1987 case from the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Exco,108 and a 1991 case from
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, Producers Pipelines,109 attempted to formulate
an approach focused on shareholder choice in the context of a hostile takeover bid.
Both cases reject Teck and hold that the shareholders should have the right “to decide to whom and at what price they will sell their shares.”110 Ultimately, “defensive
tactics that result in shareholders being deprived of the ability to respond to a takeover bid or to a competing bid are unacceptable.”111
In Producers Pipelines, the court formulated a new test for directors who deploy
defensive tactics in response to an unsolicited takeover bid. The court held that,
where the target board implements a poison pill, the directors must be able to establish: that (1) they had a good faith belief that the bid posed a threat to the
corporation; (2) they acted after proper investigation; and (3) the defensive
measures were reasonable in relation to the threat posed.112 Where the target board
responds to the bid by using a defensive tactic such as a poison pill, the court will
impose a rebuttable presumption that the directors’ motivations were improper.113
Similar to the Producers Pipelines’ test, the court in Exco held that the burden
should rest upon the directors to prove that they were acting in the best interests of
the corporation.114 If the target directors use their power to issue share capital in
the face of a hostile bid, then the directors “must be able to show that the considerations upon which the decision to issue was based are consistent only with the best
interests of the company and inconsistent with any other interests.”115 Thus, Exco
imposed a more stringent standard upon the target board than Producers Pipelines
and stands for the proposition that, when faced with a hostile takeover bid, the
directors of the target corporation should get out of the way and let the shareholders decide the fate of the bid.
(iii) The Rejection of the Shareholder Choice Approach
Subsequent superior court and appellate court decisions have rejected the
shareholder-choice approaches endorsed by Producers Pipelines and Exco. In Harold E. Ballard, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (General Division) rejected
Exco and provided some highly critical commentary on the test set forth by the
Nova Scotia Supreme Court.116 This decision was penned by Farley J., who was the
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supervising judge of the Commercial List in Toronto at the time and a highly respected corporate law expert.117 Farley J. observed that the Exco test is “unduly
harsh in that it might inhibit reasonable business decisions,”118 and that instead of a
reverse onus standard, the real question should be what “the directors had uppermost in their minds after a reasonable analysis of the situation.”119 So long as the
target board acts in the best interests of the corporation and in good faith, they will
fulfill their fiduciary duty in the face of a hostile bid.120
Producers Pipelines was rejected by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Pente Investment Management. In this case, the court commented that, in the context of a
hostile takeover bid, the “court must be satisfied that the directors have acted reasonably and fairly.”121 The Ontario Court of Appeal emphasized that directors will
meet their fiduciary duty to the corporation so long as they make a “reasonable
decision not a perfect decision,”122 and that the target board will receive the benefit
of the business judgment rule during a hostile takeover bid so long as “the directors
have selected from one of several reasonable alternatives.”123 For the court in Pente
Investment Management, the rationale for shifting the burden of proof to the target
board did not exist if the directors had successfully minimized their conflict of interest through the implementation of a properly-constituted special committee.124
4.

Summary of the Current Corporate Law Approach

Although the Supreme Court of Canada has not heard a case involving the directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of a hostile takeover bid, the foregoing
jurisprudence reveals the current position under Canadian corporate law is set out
in the lower courts: where the target board takes steps to minimize its inherent
conflict of interest, then the business judgment rule applies in the context of a hostile takeover bid. Reviewing courts will be deferential to the target board’s decision
to implement a poison pill and block the hostile bid so long as the directors act in
good faith and have a reasonable basis to believe that the bid represents a threat to
the corporation. As part of the directors’ discretionary power to manage the corporation, corporate law recognizes that it is permissible for the target board to “just
say no” to a hostile bid in circumstances where it is in the corporation’s best interests. The directors may properly consider the interests of all of the constituent
stakeholders of the corporation in arriving at their decision. Under corporate law,
the shareholders will only have the opportunity to tender to the bid where the directors believe it is in the best interests of the corporation.
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E. Proposed National Instrument 62-105: A New Direction in Poison Pill
Regulation
1.

Background

In March 2012, Maureen Jensen, the OSC’s executive director, made remarks to
the Institute of Corporate Directors on the strategic direction of the OSC.125 Ms.
Jensen commented on the direction that the OSC plans to take on shareholder democracy issues, and in particular, poison pills. She noted that, although
shareholder democracy is a corporate governance issue that has traditionally been
dealt with under corporate law, “securities regulators have been willing to regulate
in such matters to further our mandate of investor protection and fostering efficient markets.”126 Ms. Jensen commented that, although poison pills are not
directly related to shareholder democracy, it is nonetheless an issue that “goes to
the heart of how decision-making authority is allocated between the board and its
shareholders.”127
In Ms. Jensen’s address, she observed that the traditional approach to poison
pill regulation under NP 62-202 “needs to be revisited in light of the significant
market, governance and regulatory developments that have occurred since the policy was adopted in 1986.”128 The Canadian Securities Administrators (the “CSA”)
subsequently commenced a rule review aimed at “creating a transparent framework for rights plans that allow target boards more latitude in responding to
hostile bids if shareholder approval of the rights plan has been obtained.”129 Ms.
Jensen indicated that the decision on how to respond to a hostile bid should be left
to the target’s board and shareholders, rather than through regulatory hearings on
an ad hoc basis.130
2.

Concerns with the Approach under NP 62-202

In March 2013, the CSA released Proposed National Instrument 62-105 (the
“Proposed Policy”), which identifies and addresses a number of concerns with the
current regulatory approach towards poison pills. The CSA notes that “some market participants believe that the current Canadian approach generally favours
bidders rather than targets and their shareholders.”131 Some commentators have
suggested that securities regulators should revoke NP 62-202 and “stop regulating
poison pills in any respect.”132 These market participants argue that poison pills
should be dealt with by the courts as a matter of fiduciary law under the oppression
remedy contained in corporate legislation.133 In the Proposed Policy, the CSA rejects this proposition and notes that “securities regulators have a legitimate role in
125
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regulating take-over bids” and to ensure that defensive tactics do not undermine
the shareholders’ right to respond to a bid.134
In the Proposed Policy, the CSA recognizes the risk of inconsistent regulatory
decisions under the current ad hoc approach to poison pill regulation. They admit
that the “event-driven nature of decision-making” through contested hearings pursuant to NP 62-202 creates a “risk of inconsistent and unpredictable decisions” by
securities regulators.135 For the CSA, this has resulted from “different perspectives
on underlying principles, such as […] the relevance of the board’s fiduciary duty
obligations when responding to hostile takeover bids.”136
Finally, the CSA notes that some commentators have suggested that NP 62-202
and poison pill regulation in general “inappropriately fetters the discretion of target
boards to apply their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation in
a manner consistent with BCE.”137 The commentary accompanying the Proposed
Policy acknowledges this conflict, but the CSA is of the view that the final decision
regarding the adoption of a poison pill should remain with the shareholders and
not with the target board, the regulators, or the courts.138
3.

Key Features of the Proposed Policy

The Proposed Policy will establish a regulatory framework for poison pills in all
CSA jurisdictions.139 Under this new approach, poison pills will be allowed to remain in place so long as a simple majority of the shareholders of the target
corporation approve the rights plan within a specified period of time.140
The commentary accompanying the Proposed Policy notes that the purpose of
takeover regulation continues to be the fair treatment of target shareholders.141 In
contrast to NP 62-202, where the commissions decide whether to cease trade a poison pill on an ad hoc basis, the Proposed Policy will leave the ultimate choice to
shareholders and, for the most part, takes the decision out of the hands of the provincial securities commissions.142 Securities regulators do not anticipate
intervening to cease trade a rights plan that was adopted in compliance with the
Proposed Policy unless “the target issuer engages in conduct that undermines the
principles underlying the Proposed Policy or there is a public interest rationale for
intervention.”143
The Proposed Policy will allow a poison pill to remain in place indefinitely so
long as it receives shareholder approval “within 90 days from the date of adoption,”
or if the poison pill is adopted after the takeover bid has been made, then “within
90 days from the date the take-over bid was commenced.”144 The poison pill only
needs ratification from a simple majority of shareholders, and the shareholders
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may terminate the poison pill at any time by a majority vote.145 The bidder’s shares
are excluded for both of these votes.146 Finally, the poison pill cannot be used to
discriminate between takeover bids: if it is “waived or modified with respect to one
take-over bid it must be waived or modified with respect to any other take-over
bid.”147
F. Will the Proposed Policy Remedy the Uncertainty Surrounding Poison
Pills?
It appears as though the Proposed Policy will provide a degree of certainty to
poison pill regulation since securities commissions will not hear as many applications for cease trade orders as they do under the existing approach. NP 62-202
relies upon “active regulatory intervention” on an ad hoc basis to determine whether a poison pill should be cease-traded.148 Since cease trade orders are made on a
case-by-case basis, and hearing panel decisions do not have any precedential value,
this has led to inconsistent and unpredictable decisions regarding poison pills between the provincial securities regulators, and within the same regulator at
different times.149 In contrast, under the Proposed Policy, the decision of whether a
target board should adopt or retain a poison pill is left in the hands of the shareholders, and securities regulators will only intervene in limited circumstances. The
possibility for conflicting decisions on poison pills remains under the Proposed
Policy, but the frequency of those decisions should be drastically reduced.
The Proposed Policy represents an effort to have target boards self-regulate the
use of poison pills, and in the process, it takes the opportunity away from the respective provincial commissions to apply (or not apply, as the case may be) a
corporate law-inspired fiduciary duty analysis. The Proposed Policy is a positive
development for securities regulation and market participants since it provides a
set of black and white rules delineating when a poison pill is permissible and when
it is not. So long as the target board complies with the requirements of the Proposed Policy, it will not attract regulatory scrutiny. The Proposed Policy clarifies
the securities regulators’ position that the business judgment rule and the directors’
fiduciary duty are irrelevant considerations in the context of poison pill regulation.
Further, it reaffirms the CSA’s clear preference for shareholder choice in the face of
a hostile takeover bid.
G. Will the Proposed Policy Remedy the Conflict Between Securities
Regulation and Corporate Law?
Although the Proposed Policy will decrease the opportunity for uncertain results within the securities regulation context, it will not remedy the conflict
between securities regulation and corporate law. The regulation of poison pills in
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the face of a hostile takeover bid will continue to be inconsistent with the approach
set forth by the Supreme Court of Canada in BCE and Peoples. The directors’ fiduciary duty is to the corporation, yet the Proposed Policy requires the target board
to shift its duty to the consideration of shareholder interests in the context of a hostile takeover bid. The result is that Canadian directors will continue to be pulled in
two different directions when faced with a hostile takeover bid.
The Proposed Policy gives target boards greater flexibility in determining
whether to adopt and maintain a poison pill in the face of a hostile takeover bid as
it allows the target board to completely block an unsolicited bid where it is not in
the best interests of the corporation, provided the shareholders agree. In comparison to NP 62-202, the Proposed Policy gives the directors more range to respond to
bids that are not in the best interests of the corporation. However, in comparison
to the scope of directors’ power under the CBCA, the latitude that a target board
will have in responding to an unsolicited bid is significantly circumscribed under
the Proposed Policy. In the commentary accompanying the Proposed Policy, the
CSA adheres to the view that “the ultimate decision about the adoption or maintenance of a Rights Plan should remain with the shareholders and not with the board
of directors, regulators or courts.”150 This is in direct conflict with the limited rights
of shareholders under the CBCA.
Given that poison pill regulation requires the fiduciary duty of the target board
to shift from the corporation to the shareholders in the context of a hostile takeover
bid, the theoretical underpinnings of the Proposed Policy closely align with the
widely-rejected Producers Pipelines standard. The Proposed Policy supports the
notion from Producers Pipelines that defensive action in the face of a bid must interfere with shareholder choice as little as possible.151 Further, both provide that
any defensive action taken in response to the bid should be put to the shareholders
for prior or subsequent approval. This shareholder-choice model of corporate governance was rejected by Farley J. in Harold E. Ballard and by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Pente Investment Management.152
The decision to promote shareholders rights over and above the interests and
rights of the other stakeholders of the corporation also directly conflicts with the
approach set forth by the Supreme Court of Canada in BCE and Peoples. First, corporate law is clear that directors, acting in the best interests of the corporation,
have a fiduciary duty to protect, and attempt to maximize, corporate value.153
However, the Proposed Policy imposes an obligation on the target board to maximize shareholder choice in the face of a bid. This is not a problem when the bid
will maximize both corporate and shareholder value. However, maximization of
corporate and shareholder value may often be in conflict since, as BCE articulates,
the directors’ fiduciary duty is “not confined to short-term profit or share value.”154
Shareholder value in the face of a bid is necessarily short-term: if the shareholders
do not have the opportunity to tender to the bid, then it will eventually expire and
the takeover premium will evaporate.
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As opposed to the short-term focus of the shareholder-choice model, the longterm interests of a corporation involve a wider set of considerations. The decision
to promote shareholder-choice over other stakeholder interests in the corporation
in the Proposed Policy is problematic from a corporate law perspective. BCE is
clear that “in considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors
may look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their decision.”155 Where
directors give appropriate attention to the “ancillary interests” of the corporation,
courts will apply a deferential approach to the resulting decisions of the directors in
accordance with the business judgment rule.156 However, the Proposed Policy takes
away this flexibility and deference in the context of a hostile takeover bid. It shifts
the directors’ fiduciary duty away from the corporation as an aggregate entity, and
moves it to a single group within the corporation: the shareholders.
Under the current corporate law approach for directors faced with a hostile bid,
the target board is required to act in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation.157 If so, then the directors are not required to get shareholder approval for
the implementation of a poison pill and the target board can unilaterally “just say
no” to the unsolicited bid.158 In the commentary accompanying the Proposed Policy, the CSA notes that one of the alternatives to NP 62-202 is to leave “decisions as
to defensive tactics completely to the courts as a matter of fiduciary duty law.”159
The CSA concluded that the Proposed Rule is preferable since “the purpose of
take-over bid regulation is to ensure fair treatment of target shareholders and that
all market participants know what rules apply.”160 It appears as though the Proposed Policy will accomplish this, but it will be done at the expense of directors’
power to manage the corporation under corporate law.
H. Conclusion
During one of the most memorable scenes in Wall Street, Gordon Gekko
speaks at the annual general meeting of a fictional company called Teldar Paper.
Although the film does not make it explicit, Gekko appears to be involved in a
proxy battle, and he tells the shareholders that “you own the company. That’s right,
you, the stockholder.” He claims that, as a corporate raider and the largest single
shareholder of Teldar, he is “not a destroyer of companies [rather, he is] a liberator
of them.” What Gekko does not tell the Teldar shareholders is that he is selfinterested in short-term profits and he wants to elect a board of directors that will
maximize the immediate value of the corporation so that he can realise a quick
return on his investment. Gekko is not concerned with the long-term health of the
corporation, nor is he concerned with the panoply of constituent stakeholders that
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make up the modern corporation. None of this matters to the indomitable Gekko,
since “greed, for lack of a better word, is good.”
Through the CBCA and the two most recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions on the fiduciary duties of corporate directors, Canadian corporate law has
exhibited a preference for the director-centric approach in the context of a hostile
takeover bid.161 However, the poison pill regulatory framework has staked an opposite position in the battlefield for corporate control. This is problematic since, as
Gekko demonstrates, shareholders do not owe a duty to the corporation to act in
its best interests. NP 62-202 and the Proposed Policy ignore the fact that the corporation is a dynamic entity with diverse stakeholder interests, and quite often, the
target is in a vulnerable position during the course of a hostile takeover bid. For
regulators, in the context of an unsolicited bid, the shareholders’ right to choose is
paramount. This strips the directors of much of their statutory discretionary power
to manage the corporation, and as a result, the long-term interests of stakeholders
and the corporation as a whole will be undermined going forward.
If the Proposed Policy is adopted by the provincial securities regulators, the way
that target boards respond to hostile bids will change significantly. The poison pill
will only have utility for target boards in circumstances where it is clear that a majority of the shareholders will ratify it. In situations where the directors believe that
the bid is not in the best interests of the corporation, but shareholder support for
the poison pill is unclear, target boards might be reluctant to employ this defensive
tactic. After all, a shareholder vote against the poison pill is essentially a vote in
favour of the hostile bid. Despite the reduced effectiveness of the poison pill, the
fiduciary duty will still require the directors to take affirmative steps to resist the
bid in certain circumstances. Therefore, it is conceivable that directors and their
legal counsel will be forced to get creative and develop new defensive tactics that
will allow target corporations to block hostile bids.
Since all Canadian corporations that raise public capital will be subject to poison pill regulations, it appears as though the securities regulators will continue to
pick winners and losers in the market for corporate control. Whether this is done
through NP 62-202 or the Proposed Policy, one thing is clear: for better or worse,
shareholder empowerment is alive and well in Canadian corporations.
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